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Under the type of hospital and medical payment protection plans
provided by the various Blue Cross and Blue Shield programs, the
subscribing member pays a yearly fee to the Services which, in return,
agree to pay the member's hospital and medical expenses according to a
contractual schedule. The contract does not guarantee -full in-
demnification of the member for all his medical or hospital expenses. It
is designed instead to pay the subscribing member a particular scheduled
sum on the occurrence of certain contingent events such as hospi-
talization and necessary surgery. For this reason, and despite the fact
that the scheduled benefits often completely compensate the member for
his losses, courts have not regarded the Services as indemnity insurers.'
Indeed, some courts have held that Blue Cross and Blue Shield are not
insurance companies at all.
2
Although this judicial distinction may be considered somewhat aca-
demic and anomalous, 3 it has rather serious consequences for the Ser-
vices where the medical or hospital expenses of a member are the result
of injuries negligently caused by a third party tort-feasor. In making
payments to the member under the terms of the contract schedule, the
Services make no distinction as to the source of the member's injuries;
the cancer patient is paid under the same contract as the accident victim.
Where the injuries have been caused by a negligent tort-feasor, however,
the Services seek to recover their payments from the tort-feasor, or from
the member if he has been compensated by the tort-feasor. In other
words, the Services seek subrogation of the member's claim against the
tort-feasor to the extent of their actual hospital and medical ex-
penditures.
If the Services were recognized to be indemnity insurers, there would
be no question that they would be entitled to subrogation against the
*Mr. Hard is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus.
1 See Kimball & Davis, The Extension -of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 841
(1962).
2 E.g., Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954); Michigan
Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N. W.2nd 713 (1954).
3 Kimball &. Davis, supra note 1, at 868.
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tort-feasor as a matter of equity.4 Because of the characterization of the
Services as something other than insurers, however, such equitabk
subrogation has been denied. In order to acquire subrogation rights, tht
Services have written contractual subrogation clauses into their agree-
ments with subscribing members and, when necessary, have sought tc
enforce these contractual subrogation rights by intervening in actions by
members against third party tort-feasors.
Even where the Services have written a subrogation clause into the
contract, however, some courts have denied them the right to intervene.
Nevertheless, the Services continue in their attempts to intervene in
members' lawsuits against negligent third parties to protect their con-
tractual rights to subrogation, while the members, and their attorneys,
continue to oppose this practice.
Because of the persistence with which the Michigan Hospital Service
(Blue Cross) and the Michigan Medical Service (Blue Shield) have
attempted to intervene, and because of the conflicting responses of the
lower courts of Michigan, this article will analyze the interests of the
respective parties and the reasons for their adamant positions on the
issue of intervention within the context of present Michigan law. It will
also propose a statutory resolution of the problem.
This article does not purport to provide a study of the doctrine of
subrogation and the merits of that doctrine in the context of insurance
coverage. There are several difficult questions which could be raised as
to the proper role of subrogation in insurance litigation.5 This article
assumes the propriety of extending the right of subrogation to the type
of medical and hospital payment plans offered by the Services and
analyses the device of intervention as a method of enforcing the Ser-
vices' right to contractual subrogation.
II. Attitudes of Parties Toward Intervention
The problem is by no means an infrequent occurrence in Michigan;
since May 1965, the Services have attempted to intervene in "about ten
4 Id. at 841. Professor Kimball categorizes subrogation rights into two types, "legal" and
conventional". The former refers to those rights of subrogation which arise under the
equitable principles of fairness and which exist independently of any express stipula-
tion by the parties. "Conventional" subrogation, on the other hand, arises only
because the parties have made a valid contractual agreement that one of the parties
will be subrogated to the rights of the other if certain events come to pass. For
purposes of clarity in this article the same conceptual distinction will be maintained,
but the author prefers to use the term "equitable" rather than "legal" subrogation,
and "contractual" rather than "conventional".
5 Kimball & Davis, supra note 1. The authors conclude that thorough, well-documented
empirical research might reveal that rather than expanding the use of the doctrine of
subrogation in the area of insurance, particularly in the context of "conventional"




-ases" in the Wayne Circuit Court alone. 6 The issue arises under mo-
iotonously similar circumstances. Typically, a member is injured due to
:he apparent negligence of a third party. The Services pay the hospital
ind medical bills under the terms of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
:ertificates. The member then brings a personal injury action against the
tort-feasor. The instigation of this lawsuit brings into operation certain
rights described in the "subrogation clauses" found in the certificates of
both Services. 7 It is the nature of these rights which is in dispute.
In the vast majority of cases, the enforcement of the rights under the
subrogation clauses is a routine procedure whereby the parties agree on
the nature of the rights and the allocation of the potential damage award
between the member and the Services if the member is successful in his
tort action. In general, these determinations are made by the member's
attorney and the Subrogation Department of the Michigan Blue
Cross-Blue Shield. Usually the determination is easily made since the
hospital and medical bills are definite in amount. In the likely event that
there is a settlement of the lawsuit, the process also proceeds with
relative ease. The Services will agree to take an amount or percentage of
the settlement figure.
In the event that the member refuses to acknowledge the subrogation
rights of the Services, or refuses to give any assurance of recognition of
6 Letter from Charles R. Kinnaird, Jr., of the law firm of Long, Preston & Evans, Detroit,
Michigan [house counsel to Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield] to Lawrence E. Hard,
October 7, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Kinnairdl.
7 Blue Cross claims to have a contractual right of subrogation on the basis of the provi-
sions found in Section IX(K) of the Michigan Hospital Service Certificate:
In the event any hospital service is provided or any
payment is made therefor under this contract, the Ser-
vice Association shall be subrogated and succeed to the
rights of recovery of any member for such hospital ser-
vice against any person or organization, except against
insurers on policies of insurance issued to and in the
name of such member. All sums recovered, by suit,
settlement or otherwise, on account of such hospital
service shall be paid over to the Service Association.
Members shall take such action, furnish such information
and assistance, and execute such assignments and other
instruments as the Service Association may request to
facilitate enforcement of the rights of the Service Associ-
ation hereunder, and shall take no action prejudicing the
rights and interests of the Service Association hereunder.
Blue Shield claims its rights to contractual subrogation under Section 6 of the
Michigan Medical Service Certificate:
SUBROGATION: In the event of any payment for
services under this certificate, Blue Shield shall be sub-
rogated to all the member's rights of recovery therefor
against any person or organization except against insur-
ers on policies issued to and in the name of the sub-
scriber, and the member shall execute and deliver such
instruments and papers and do whatever else is neces-
sary to secure such rights.
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those rights with respect to the claims which are the subject of his suit
the issue of enforcement of the contractual subrogation rights arises
Since 1963, the Services have had to commence over one hundred anc
seventy subrogation enforcement actions against members.8 There are
three basic methods by which such rights are enforced: 9
1. The member and his attorney may be informed that future Blue
Cross-Blue Shield benefits will be withheld until the issue of subrogation
rights has been satisfactorily resolved.
2. A separate suit based on the contract may be instituted against the
member to recover for the Services their proportionate share of the
amount recovered by the member from the third party tort-feasor.
3. The Services may seek to intervene in the member's action against
the negligent third party.
The first two methods have been effective in promoting out of court
settlements in the majority of such cases. After expensive and
time-consuming proceedings, pretrial procedures, motions, and "a cer-
tain amount of cathartic shouting and arm-waving",' 0 the parties usually
agree on a settlement.
To enforce their contractual subrogation rights in the remaining cases
which are not resolved out of court, the Services almost always seek
to intervene. Both the "pressure" method of intimidating the member to
recognize the subrogation rights of the Services by threatening to refuse
future coverage 1 and active prosecution of a direct suit against the
member to collect the reimbursement fees are disfavored by the Ser-
vices. Blue Cross and Blue Shield as large, quasi-public institutions are
highly conscious of their public image.12 Any such activities on their
" Kinnaird.
" Long, Subrogation Rights of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 43 MICH. S.B.J. 47 (August 1964).
10 Kinnaird.
11 See Silver, Blue Cross and. the Myth of the Sharpe Cases, 43 MICH. S.B.J. 15 (Novem-
ber 1964). Mr. Silver includes in his discussion the following portions of a form notice
used by the Services to inform the member that his hospital and medical protections
have been suspended:
[Because of the provisions of the subrogation clauses],
we have determined to withhold all future benefits under
your Blue Cross-Blue Shield Subscriber Certificates, for
all members covered thereby, until we have received
subrogation payments due us, with respect to the above
hospital admission, or satisfactory information indicating
that no such payments are due. 43 MICH. S.B.J. at 15.
12 Michigan Blue Cross and Blue Shield are voluntary non-profit periodic prepayment
plans for hospital and medical service. They are separate corporations whose services
are usually engaged simultaneously because of the complementary nature of their
coverage. Special statutes provided for their incorporation in 1939 (MIcH. COMP. L.
§§550.301 to 550.316, and 550.501 to 550.517). They are not governed by the laws
of Michigan "with respect to insurance corporations", but they are "subject to
regulation and supervision by the commissioner of insurance". MiCH. CoMp. L.
§§550.301, 550.501 (1948). In fact, both acts provide that the names of the two
corporations shall Pot include the words "insurance, casualty, surety, health and
402 [Vol. 2
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part would attract immediate attention, since at the present time about
one out of every two people in the state of Michigan is a member of
some Blue Cross-Blue Shield program. 13 It is clearly poor public rela-
tions to be involved in a large number of lawsuits, particularly against
their own members. In addition, it is an unsavory practice to deprive
members and their families of needed medical and hospital coverage, or
even to threaten to do so. As a result, the Services have traditionally
relied almost exclusively on intervention to enforce their rights under
the contract when voluntary recognition by the members cannot be
secured.
Attorneys for the member-plaintiffs are opposed to the intervention of
the Services in the principal lawsuit. 14 They are primarily concerned
about the possible adverse effects upon a jury verdict if it is known that
Blue Cross and Blue Shield have already paid the hospital and medical
expenses for the plaintiff. There is a fear that such knowledge on the
part of the jury would offend the "collateral source rule" which protects
the right of the plaintiff to claim amounts in tort actions for sums not
actually expended or lost. 15 1t is also felt that as a matter of litigation
accident, mutual or other words descriptive of the insurance or surety business."
MICH. COMP. L. §§550.303, 550.504 (1948).
The extent to which they are "public" rather than "private" institutions is demon-
strated by various provisions of Michigan law:
Both Blue Cross and Blue Shield are characterized by statute as "charitable and
benevolent" institutions exempt from taxation. MIcH. COMP. L. §§550.315, 550.515
(1948).
The Boards of Directors of both corporations must contain representatives of the
"public" as well as qualified medical personnel. MICH. COMP. L. §§550.308, 550.502
(1948).
Blue Shield is authorized to receive payments from governmental agencies "cov-
ering all or part of the cost of subscriptions to provide medical care for needy
persons." MICH. CoMP. L. §550.313 (1948). Blue Cross is also authorized to receive
payments from the government for "persons in need of hospital care who cannot pay
the cost of subscription." MICH. COMp. L. §550.510 (1948).
13 Long, supra note 9, at 47.
14 It is perhaps more accurate to say that the plaintiffs' bar is opposed to any type of
reimbursement to the Services. They are opposed to intervention as a means of
seeking such reimbursement. See Silver, supra note 11.
15 The "collateral source rule" is so named because the defendant is not permitted to
establish that the plaintiff did not actually sustain the amount of injury alleged, if
diminution resulted from the resources of a "collateral source". As a result of the
widespread acceptance of this rule (Alabama is the only state which does not recog-
nize the "collateral source rule"), American courts have not permitted defendants to
reduce damages by introducing evidence that plaintiffs have received proceeds from,
among other sources, hospitalization insurance. E.g., Conley v. Foster, 335 S.W.2d
904 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960). See generally Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964).
The "collateral source rule" is applied in Michigan. Royer v. Eskovitz, 358 Mich.
279, 283, 100 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1960).
For a general discussion of the "collateral source rule" and its particular appli-




tactics the jury may be less sympathetic toward the member's plight if it
is known that he has not personally borne all the burdens resulting from
his injury. Moreover, there is a possible conflict of interest problem for a
plaintiff's attorney if he must represent both his client and the Services;
his client wants to maximize his recovery, while the Services want to
reserve part of that recovery for themselves. In addition, these attorneys
feel that they can bargain with the Services, and perhaps pay a smaller
amount out of any damage award to Blue Cross-Blue Shield, if the
Services can be kept out of the principal action. There is more leverage
for their bargaining position if it is known that the Services will not
automatically become a party to the action. 16
III. Requirements for Intervention
The prior Michigan intervention statute allowed intervention by any-
one "claiming an interest in the litigation", but only at the discretion of
the court.' 7 Intervention as of right was not available under that statute
which contained no provision for a right to intervene comparable to Rule
209.1(3) of the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963:18
Rule 209. Intervention
1 Intervention of Right. Anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action... (3) upon
timely application when the representation of
the applicant's interest by existing parties is
or may be inadequate and the applicant may
be bound by a judgment in the action;
There are three conditions which must be shown by the Services
before the court can allow intervention as of right:
1. that they have an interest in the matter being litigated in the main
action;
2. that this interest may be inadequately represented by the plaintiff's
counsel; and
3. that the Services may be bound by the judgment in the main action.
The right of the Services to intervene depends primarily on whether
the Services have a sufficient interest in the member's lawsuit. The
crucial dispute centers on the existence of such an interest, and as a
result, very little has been decided by the courts as to the nature of the
second and third conditions. Once a court finds that the prospective
intervenor has no interest, it has to go no further, for it has demonstrated
that there is no right to intervene. In at least one opinion, however, the
16 From interviews with plaintiffs' attorneys in Ann Arbor, Michigan during October
1968.
17 MICH. COMp. L. §612.11 (1948).
18 MICH. GEN. CT. R. 209.1(3) (1963). Rule 209.1(3) is based on Rule 24(a)(2) of the FED.
R. Civ. P., adopted in 1938.
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Wayne Circuit Court found that the latter two conditions were met by
the Services. 19 Certainly, in a broad sense, the Services have some type
of interest in the action brought by the member against the third party
tort-feasor. They have already expended a certain amount of money in
payment for hospital and medical expenses on behalf of the member. At
the time when the member contracted with the Services to provide such
coverage, he agreed to give to Blue Cross and Blue Shield certain rights
contained in the subrogation clauses of both contracts. Basically, these
provisions stipulate that in the event that the Services make hospital and
medical payments on behalf of the member, he agrees that the Services
"shall be subrogated" to any rights of recovery which the member might
have against the tort-feasor.
The basic issue on which the Michigan lower courts have disagreed is
whether this contractual subrogation stipulation, in and of itself, gives
the Services sufficient interest to permit them to intervene as of right. At
least one court, influenced by the liberal wording of Rule 209, has held
that this contractual subrogation clause provides the Services with the
requisite interest to allow their intervention as of right.20 Taking a
contrary approach, however, other courts have looked to additional
language in the subrogation clauses to find that the Services do not
acquire any rights of subrogation until the member has actually assigned
his rights against the tort-feasor to the Services. If no assignment is
made by the member, the Services can enforce the contract provision
against the member only by bringing a separate lawsuit. According to
this view, the right to enforce the contractual stipulation is not deemed
sufficient to give the Services an interest in the principal action for
purposes of intervention.
To a certain extent, the executory nature of the subrogation clauses
which the Services have written into their contracts is responsible for
the judicial confusion. Since the language of the subrogation clause is
executory, some courts have understandably concluded that any right of
subrogation provided by such clauses is not self-executing, but requires
cooperative action on the part of the member before the Services can
claim any rights by subrogation. Until the member performs in accor-
dance with the provisions of the subrogation clauses, the Services have
only an executory right to enforce subrogation, a right which these
courts deem an insufficient interest to support intervention. Thus, it
might be plausibly argued that the Services need only amend their
subrogation clauses to make them self-executing in order to solve their
problem of intervention.
The Services, however, have a perhaps compelling reason for avoiding
self-executing language in their subrogation clauses. A self-executing
19 Opinion on Motions to Intervene, Accuso v. Strickland, Civil No. 19491 and Wilhelm v.




subrogation right is, in effect, an assignment of a claim, and under the
Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, such an assignment makes the
subrogee-assignee a necessary party to the action subject to the rules of
compulsory joinder.2 1 Such a result is not palatable to either the Ser-
vices or to the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Services wish only to intervene
in those few cases where the member refuses to recognize voluntarily
their subrogation rights and the amount involved is worth the effort.
They certainly do not want the expense and unnecessary burden of
being a party to every lawsuit brought by a member against a tort-feasor.
For their part, the plaintiffs' attorneys who have opposed even the most
infrequent and sporadic presence of the Services by intervention would
undoubtedly be even more strongly opposed to the necessary presence
of the Services in every action. It would appear that the only possible
beneficiary of such a situation would be the defendant tort-feasor who
could compel the joinder of the Services as a simple delaying tactic and
for the purpose of impressing the jury with the fact of the plaintiff's
medical and hospital payments coverage.
In sum, the courts will not recognize the Services as indemnity insur-
ers, entitled to equitable subrogation without the need for contractual
subrogation by assignment of claims.2 2 On the other hand, the Services
do not want to write self-executing subrogation clauses into their con-
tracts, for such clauses would probably subject them to compulsory
joinder in every member's action since they would have acquired a
direct cause of action against the tort-feasor. Thus, the Services are
attempting to guarantee themselves the right to intervene selectively by
writing a hybrid, executory subrogation clause into their certificates.
IV. Judicial Treatment of the Services'
Attempts to Intervene
The majority of Michigan courts are reluctant to grant the Services
the opportunity to intervene at will, holding that the contractual clause
which is intended to provide that option instead provides the grounds for
denying it. These courts uniformly refer to two companion cases decided
in 1954 in which the Michigan Supreme Court ruled on the nature of the
subrogation rights acquired by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Since these
cases, rightly or wrongly, have had such a profound influence on the
Michigan lower courts, and courts elsewhere,23 resulting in the present
state of confusion over the Services' right to intervene, they will be
examined in some detail.
21 MICH. GEN. CT. R. 205 (1963).
22 Kimball & Davis, supra note 1.
23 E.g., Hospital Serv. Corp. of Rhode Island v. The Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105
(R.I. 1967); Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33
Wis.2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
[Vol. 2:2
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A. The Sharpe Cases
These two cases, Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe 24 and Mich-
'gan Medical Service v. Sharpe,25 involved the same injured members
md tort-feasors. Both actions arose out of an automobile accident in
xhich the defendant Sharpe required hospitalization and medical care
-esulting from the negligence of the defendant tort-feasor. Sharpe made a
:laim against the tort-feasor which resulted in a settlement. The Services
-equested Sharpe to pay them out of the sum received from the
:ort-feasor at least part of the amounts expended by the Services for
nedical and hospital care. Sharpe refused to make any payment to either
Service.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield then brought separate actions against both
Sharpe and the tort-feasor to recover their respective expenditures. In
the first Sharpe case, Blue Cross based its claim on the common law and
equitable principles of subrogation and sought recovery from Sharpe of
all sums received by him from the tort-feasor for hospital services fur-
nished under the hospital care certificate. Blue Cross also claimed recov-
ery from the tort-feasor for the cost and value of hospital services
furnished to Sharpe and made necessary by the negligent and willful
misconduct of the tort-feasor. In this first Sharpe decision, the court
looked to the nature of the coverage plan provided by Blue Cross and
concluded that it was not an insurance contract at all. Rather, the
certificate stipulated that in the event that the member required hospi-
talization, the Service would be responsible for making all necessary
payments:
There is no question that this service was
purchased with the understanding that hospi-
tal care would be furnished the purchaser
'whenever needed.'... Plaintiff thus had a
primary obligation to provide service in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract. [Em-
phasis added].2
Thus, Blue Cross, not being an insurer, had no equitable right of sub-
rogation. Moreover, since the Blue Cross certificate did not contain a
subrogation clause, it lacked any contractual basis for recovery of its
payment of the member's hospital expenses. In light of this "conclusive"
omission, the court could find "not one iota of intent on the part of the
plaintiff [Blue Cross] to recover for hospital services rendered. '2 7 The
Service had neither an equitable nor contractual ground on which to
base a subrogation recovery.
2 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954).
2 Id. at 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954).
26 Id. at 373, 64 N.W.2d at 641.
27 Id. at 369-370, 64 N.W.2d at 639.
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The second Sharpe case, unlike the first involved an express subroga-
tion clause. Under the provisions of that clause, Blue Shield did have a
valid claim to be subrogated:
Enrichment of plaintiff is not unjust if pur-
suant to the express agreement of the parties,
fairly and honestly arrived at before hand. It
is neither unjust, unfair nor inequitable to
give effect to an agreement which was not
induced by mistake, overreaching, fraud or
misrepresentation.... To agree with defend-
ants that the subrogation clause gave plaintiff
no rights whatsoever is to read it out of the
agreement by rendering it meaningless.
28
However, the existence of such a contractual right of subrogation did
not mean that the Service was automatically subrogated to the rights of
the member defendant against the tort-feasor defendant:
Defendants Sharpe have failed and neglected
to perform the assignment obligation.... As
for the tort-feasor,... plaintiff's brief correctly
states that 'liability cannot be cast on him by
a contract to which he was not a party.' De-
fendants Sharpe have given plaintiff no as-
signment against the tort-feasor as provided
in the certificate.
29
In the absence of an actual assignment, the court concluded that the
Service did not have a right of subrogation because it was not an
"insurance company" within the meaning of Michigan insurance law.30
The second Sharpe case supports the conclusion that the Service can
be subrogated to the rights of the member against the tort-feasor only it
the member makes an actual assignment of his cause of action to the
Service.3 1 The Service is still entitled, however, to enforce its rights ot
subrogation under the contract by bringing a separate action against the
member.
B. Subsequent Cases
It is important to note that in neither Sharpe case was there reference
to the doctrine of intervention. Instead, the court in both cases speci-
28 1d. at 577, 64 N.W.2d at 714.
29 Id. at 577-578, 64 N.W.2d at 714.
30 d. at 578, 64 N.W.2d at 714.
31 Such a conclusion does not contravene the common law doctrine that a cause of action
for personal injuries is not assignable since the Services are only seeking to recover
against the tort-feasor on the basis of their contract to provide hospital and medical
care. Nor is it forbidden by the public policy which "forbids invasion of recoveries
arising out of personal injury and loss of earning ability." Silver, supra note 11, at 16.
The second Sharpe opinion makes it clear that such an assignment can be made
without contravening public policy.
[Vol. 2:2
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fically held that since neither Service was an "insurance company" it
could not "claim the benefit of [former] CL 1948, §612.2 (Stat. Ann.
§27,654) that permits insurers to join in actions against tort-feasors at
law." [Emphasis added]. 32 In other words, the Services could not be
subrogated because they did not have a direct cause of action against the
tort-feasor sufficient to permit them to be joined to the principal action.
The essential concept was that of joinder, not intervention. 33 Never-
theless, various circuit courts have subsequently relied on the Sharpe
decisions to deny the Services the right to intervene on the ground that
there has not been an assignment of a cause of action by the member
and that, therefore, the Services do not have a direct cause of action
against the tort-feasor.
Perhaps the most articulate elaboration of this point of view was given
by Judge Weideman of the Wayne Circuit Court in the case of Hensley
v. Gaffrey.34 In reference to the passage from the second Sharpe opinion
which spoke of the necessity of making a direct assignment, Judge
Weideman stated that:
In clear language, it has been established that
Blue Cross-Blue Shield did not acquire an
independent right against the tort-fea-
sor.... Therefore, it is apparent that the ap-
plicants, without an assignment, have no di-
rect right against the tort-feasor who injured
their subscriber. [Emphasis in the original]. 35
On the basis of this lack of a direct cause of action, the judge found
himself "compelled to conclude that Blue Cross-Blue Shield have no
contract right (interest) upon which they can base their right to inter-
vene."3
6
A similar opinion was expressed by seven judges of the Oakland
Circuit Court in a decision consolidating four cases in which the Ser-
vices sought to intervene.3 7 The court found that:
This language [subrogation clause] merely
creates a promise or obligation on the part of
the subscribers to execute such assignments
32339 Mich. 357, 370-371, 63 N.W.2d, 638, 640; 339 Mich. 574, 578. 64 N.W.2d 713,
764.
33 See note 41 infra.
34 Hensley v. Gaffrey, Civil No. 24763, (Cir.Ct., Wayne County, Mich. 1965). Automo-
bile negligence action brought by the member, Hensley, against the tort-feasor.
3 id. at 5.
36 Id. at 6.
37 Sells v. Sutherland, Civil No. 7441; Miettunen v. Adams, Civil No. 8821; Brevoort v.
Malone, Civil No. 8904; and Davis v. Ball, Civil No. 9147, (Cir. Ct., Oakland
County, Mich. 1965). Negligence cases in which all the plaintiffs sought to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained.
k.pril 1969]
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and does not give the insuring corporations
any right or cause of action against the de-
fendant tortfeasor unless and until the sub-
scriber plaintiff executes such assignment of
interest to the insuring corporation. [Empha-
sis added]. 3 8
The Oakland court emphasized that the language of the subrogation
clause was not self-executing, thus reiterating the position of the court in
the second Sharpe case. In a rather unique treatment of the problem of
intervention as of right, the Oakland court never referred to the basis for
that right, Rule 209, thereby avoiding any interpretation of the meaning
of "interest":
While the petitioners have the right to insist
upon subrogation to the extent of payments
made by them for and on behalf of the other
plaintiffs, they do not have any cause of ac-
tion against the respective defendants until
they have obtained the assignment of the
plaintiffs' claim to the extent required.
An order may enter denying the petitioners
the right to intervene in these respective
causes. 39
While the Oakland Circuit Court did not specifically cite the Sharpe
cases, those judges would undoubtedly agree with Judge Weideman of
the Wayne Circuit Court that:
Notwithstanding the fact that there has been
a liberalization of rules regarding real parties
in interest in Michigan since the Sharpe deci-
sions were announced, there remains the
decisive fact that there has been no assign-
ment.., which thereby renders inapplicable
these new provisions.
4 0
The "liberalization of rules" is a reference to the enactment of the
Michigan General Court Rules in 1963. However, it would not appear
that the new rules are "inapplicable." Insofar as there has been no
assignment, the revised rules of joinder are certainly inapplicable to the
present problem. 41 Yet it is precisely because there is no direct cause of
3 8 1 d. at 2, 3.
39 Id. at 3.
40 Hensley v. Gaffrey, supra note 34, at 7. See also Mierzwa v. Zielke, Civil No.
N 64-353, (Cir. Ct., Macomb County, Mich. 1964).,
41 The distinction between joinder and intervention is critical for the purposes of this
analysis. Joinder is the procedure whereby either the plaintiff, the defendant, or the
court requires the inclusion of a third party in the main action on the ground that the
outside party has such an intimate connection with the main action that his interests
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action against the tort-feasor that intervention is the appropriate proce-
dure for Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Rule 209 allows a party to intervene in
an action even where that party cannot be forced into the action under
the rules of joinder.4 2 Since the Sharpe cases were decided prior to the
enactment of Rule 209 in 1963, and since in any event they were not
addressed to the problem of intervention either by right or judicial
discretion, reliance on the Sharpe cases to deny the Services the right to
intervene in cases arising since 1963 is questionable.
Three members of the Wayne Circuit Court, in a decision rendered
prior to Judge Weideman's decision in Hensley, found that Rule 209 did
give the Services a right to intervene. Their opinion in the companion
cases of Accuso v. Strickland and Wilhelm v. Conlin,43 consolidating two
automobile negligence cases in which Blue Cross and Blue Shield sought
to intervene, is addressed directly to the problem of interpreting the
meaning of "interest" in Rule 209.1(3). The Accuso court had, little
difficulty in settling the question of what constituted the "applicant's
interest":
We may reason, therefore, only for the pur-
pose of the pending motions, that the
would-be intervenors have valid subrogation
agreements which give them an economic
stake in the outcome of the principal
cases.... A person having an economic stake
in the outcome of the main case would appear
to be within the plain meaning of the words
'anyone' and 'applicant's interest'. 44
The court found that the Services had an "economic stake" in the
outcome of the main action because of their contractual rights of sub-
rogation. None of the parties concerned denied the existence of the
subrogation clauses, nor did any party attack those clauses as "illegal,
invalid, or unenforceable. ' 45 After describing how the Services were
must be adjudicated along with those of either the plaintiff or the defendant. This
procedure is allowed primarily in the interest of eliminating multiple litigation over
what is usually considered to be a single, interrelated transaction. See Micu. GEN.
CT. R. 201, 205, 206, 207 (1963).
Intervention is the procedure whereby the third party can initiate his inclusion in
the main action on the ground that he has an interest in the principal suit sufficient to
put him on a level with the principal parties. Since he has volunteered himself as a
"party", he must be willing to be bound by the judgment along with the principal
parties. See MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 209 (1963).
42 See Note, Recent Decisions -Procedure- Intervention -Blue Cross & Blue Shield Per-
mitted to Intervene-Subrogation Rights Upheld in Negligent Injury Case, 43 U.
DET. L.J. 425, 426 n.8, 430 n.32 (1966).
43 Accuso v. Strickland, Civil No. 19491, and Wilhelm v. Conlin, Civil No. 20154, (Cir.
Ct., Wayne County, Mich. 1965) (automobile negligence cases brought by the mem-
bers to recover for personal injuries).
44 Id. at 4.
45 Id. at 3.
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entitled to reimbursement ."out of such sums as plaintiffs may recove
from defendants for medical and hospital expenses, '4 6 the court con-
cluded that "such an economic interest would be one within the meaning
of the words 'applicant's interest' as used in Rule 209.1(3)." 4 7
It would appear that the Accuso opinion represents a sound and
sensible analysis of the purpose of Rule 209.1(3) and the correct appli-
cation of that rule to the problem of the right of the Services to inter-
vene. There is no basis in Michigan law for the requirement that an
applicant for intervention have a direct cause of action against the third
party tort-feasor.48 Insofar as courts have interpreted Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24(a) (2), the model for the Michigan rule, parties have
been allowed to intervene if they have a substantial economic interest in
the outcome of the action, with no requirement that they have a direct
cause of action. 49 In addition, the general language of Rule 209.1(3)
4 6 Id. at 4.
47 Id.
48 In Chandler v. Preston, 207 Mich. 244, 174 N.W. 205 (1919), the principal suit was by a
settlor against a trustee for accounting and removal. An attorney, who was by
separate agreement entitled to part of the trustee's compensation, was permitted to
intervene. In an earlier case, McMillan v. School District No. 2, 200 Mich. 280, 167
N.W. 48 (1918), the trustee in bankruptcy of a contractor sued the defendant school
district for sums which the bankrupt claimed under a construction contract. The
contractor's surety bondsmen were permitted to intervene on the grounds that they
had a direct financial interest in the principal suit. Intervention was permitted where
the bondsmen were merely general creditors with an interest in any recovery as well
as where the bondsmen had rights of subrogation.
Other Michigan cases addressed to the same issue of the necessary interest to
intervene are: Detroit & N. Mich. Bldg. & Loan Assn., v. Oram, 200 Mich. 485,
49 1-92, 167 N.W. 50, 54 (1918) (intervention allowed by executor of estate in action
by mortgagor against remaindermen under the will); Stratford Arms Hotel Co. v.
General Cas. & Sur. Co., 249 Mich. 518, 229 N.W. 506 (1930) (principal on bond
allowed to intervene and file plea in recoupment in suit brought directly against the
surety on the bond); Ford Motor Co. v. Blair, 259 Mich. 574, 244 N.W. 167 (1932)
(creditors who had brought garnishment proceedings against debtor contractor
allowed to intervene in action brought by other creditors to reach a fund admittedly
owed by garnishee corporation to debtor contractor).
49 Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Caroline Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1951)
(insurer allowed to intervene as of right under FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a)(2) in action of
insured against negligent third party to recover pro rata share of amount recovered);
Black v. Texas Employers Ins. Assn., 326 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964) (workmen's
compensation insurer allowed to intervene because of statutory subrogation rights);
In re McElrath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (interest in reputation is a sufficient
interest for intervention as of right); cf. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338
U.S. 366 (1949) (subrogee insurance company is a real party in interest).
For other federal decisions where intervention of right was granted to applicants
having a substantial economic interest in the outcome of litigation, but no direct cause
of action, see Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957) (principal
action brought by property owners to enjoin the operation of facilities owned by
defendant railroad, manufacturer entitled to intervene as of right because of its vital
economic interest in defendant's railroad service); Northeast Clackamas C.E. Co-Op.
v. Continental Cas. Co., 221 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1955) (contractor's claim against
contractee involved issues similar to those of contractee's claim against the con-
[Vol. 2:
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indicates an intention to make the right of intervention more accessible
to persons with various interests in the principal action. This broadening
of the doctrine of intervention is consistent with the purpose of the
revised Michigan General Court Rules to facilitate the speedy and
inexpensive determination of legal issues.
50
V. Resolution of the Problem
Clearly the present dispute over the right of the Michigan Blue
Cross-Blue Shield programs to intervene in actions brought by their
members against third party tort-feasors should be resolved. The burden
on the parties and the court system of struggling with an identical issue
on numerous occasions is obvious. In addition to considerations of
efficiency, both in time and money, there is also the goal of any rational
and ordered legal system to provide a uniform application of its laws.
An alternative to the present system would be to have the Services
take assignments on a mass basis, such as when a member enters a
hospital for treatment. This procedure would certainly meet the require-
ments of those courts that insist on an actual assignment of the mem-
ber's cause of action against the tort-feasor. However, to the extent that
this method would result in the inclusion of the Services in every suit
brought by members against negligent third parties, it would meet with
the same objections from both the Services and the plaintiffs' attorneys
that were discussed earlier with respect to having a self-executing subro-
gation clause in the contracts. 5' In addition to those disadvantages,
such a system would be extremely cumbersome to operate. Equally
important, the plan would be unlikely to meet with public approval, for
the members would probably resent the presence of a self-interested
insurance representative at a time of great anxiety for them. Indeed,
there also exists the possibility that such assignments might not be
enforceable because of duress. Since neither party is likely to be in favor
of the assignment system, this alternative should not be considered a
satisfactory solution to the present problem.
At least one commentator 52 has suggested that an alternative to the
present system might lie in the hope that other courts would follow the
example of the Accuso court by ordering intervention but subjecting any
such intervention to "reasonable conditions protective of the rights of
tractor's surety and contractor permitted to intervene in contractee's action against
contractor's surety); International Mortgage & Inv. Co. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857
(2nd Cir. 1962) (after property of corporation was seized, shareholder allowed to
intervene); cf. Mack v. Passiac Nati. Bank & Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir.
1945); Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Strate v. Niagara Mach. &
Tool Works, 160 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.Ind. 1958); United States v. C.M. Lane Lifeboat
Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).50 See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 13 (1963).
51 See text at 405-06 supra.
52 See note 42 supra.
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the plaintiffs." 53 The advantage of such an order is that it respects the
restrictions of the "collateral source rule." a54 Basically, the order allows
the Services to intervene but only sub silentio; they cannot be named as
intervenors, nor can any reference be made by any party to their prior
payments and other interests which they might have in the main action.
The other main stipulation of the order is that the Services are entitled
to a share in any judgment recovered against the defendant tort-feasor.
This approach to the problem is appealing in its realistic balancing of
interests and its provision of a method whereby both parties can protect
their particular concerns in the outcome of the main action.
The difficulty with this suggestion is that it begs the crucial question of
whether the Services have a right to intervene at all. Although the
compromise inherent in such an order removes most of the objections
which the plaintiffs' attorneys have against intervention, and is accept-
able to the Services, it cannot, in itself, create any rights. An order is
merely a structuring of the remedy and presupposes the existence of a
right to intervene. Since it is evident that some judges, despite Rule
209.1(3), are not persuaded that the Services have any right to inter-
vene, it cannot be expected that such judges will allow intervention
simply because, by framing such a conditional order, they could do so
without offending the plaintiffs' bar.
Still another option might be to amend Rule 209.1(3) to duplicate the
1966 amendments to the comparable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2). The federal rule grants the right of intervention to persons
claiming an interest the enforcement of which may "as a practical
matter" be impaired by the outcome of the principal action. This might
be a reasonable approach, consistent with the origin and purpose of the
revised Michigan General Court Rules, were it not for the fact that the
amendment might be subject to varied interpretations. The same Mich-
igan courts which have interpreted the "applicant's interest" to be sy-
nonymous with "direct cause of action" may find that intervention is not
necessary "as a practical matter." Consequently, the simple adoption of
the language of Federal Rule 24(a)(2) in the Michigan General Court
Rules might not achieve the desired result.
In order to obtain at least the semblance of consistency in Michigan
courts regarding this issue, the most effective solution would be to
include in Rule 209.1 an explicit provision directed at the particular
relationship between Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield and the principal
action. Such an amendment might read as follows:
209.1 (5) upon timely application, and subject
to such conditions as the court may impose
53 Order of Intervention, Accuso v. Strickland, Civil No. 19491, and Wilhelm v. Conlin,
Civil No. 20154, (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich. 1965).54 See note 15 supra.
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for protecting the interests of parties, when
the applicant asserts a claim for reimburse-
ment out of the judgment, based upon a prior
written agreement with a party, on account of
expenditures incurred for the benefit of such
party in connection with the injury which is
the subject of the principal action.
This type of amendment gives the Services no right of subrogation they
did not already possess, but merely clarifies the procedural effect of such
a right. As a result of this amendment, the Services will not be forced to
initiate a separate lawsuit against a member in order to enforce a right to
which the member agreed and which he cannot ultimately resist.
Although clear statutory recognition of the Services' right to intervene
in members' lawsuits is certain to meet strenuous objection from the
plaintiffs' bar,55 it is submitted that the clear intent of Rule 209.1 (3) was
to permit such intervention. Of course, once the Services are assured of
their right to intervene, no reason can be seen why they would not be
willing to accept such an order of intervention as was promulgated by
the Accuso court. 56 By conditioning the Services' right to intervene on
their agreement to remain invisible at the trial, such an order would
satisfy the Services' desire to protect their interests, while also mollify-
ing the desire of the plaintiffs' attorneys to shield the jury from any
possible prejudice resulting from evidence of medical and hospital
benefits already paid.
Finally, it is quite likely that even such a protective order will prove
unnecessary, for it is possible that the most significant effect of an
5 If the current opposition to the claim of the Services for the fight to intervene under
existing law is any indication, a statutory guarantee of that right will be very strongly
opposed.
56 An order such as that issued by the Accuso court poses some procedural difficulties.
Under the prior, wholly discretionary intervention rule, even a party with the most
uncontestable right to intervene might find that right subject to any number of
discretionary conditions. One of the purposes of Rule 209.1 was to create the
category of intervenor as of right and to give such intervenor all the participatory
rights of an original party. The proposed amendment specifically authorizes the court
to impose such conditions on intervention as are necessary to protect the parties.
Without this proposed statutory authorization, it could be argued that such a condi-
tioning of the right to intervention violates the purpose of Rule 209.1. See I J.
HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN GENERAL COURT-Rules ANNOTATED, Rule
209, Author's Comment 5 (1962).
The Accuso order also stipulates that if the Services and the member are unable to
agree as to the allocation of the judgment, then the court may "require the jury to
return a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon the issue of what
portion of the total amount of any verdict returned in favor of plaintiffs is attributable
to" the services furnished by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Under MIcH. GEN. C. R. 514
(1963), the jury must return either a special or a general verdict; it cannot return both
types of verdicts. This problem could very likely be easily overcome, for in the event
that a party challenges this part of such an order on the grounds that it is contrary to
Rule 514, alternative methods for determining the proper allocation of the damage
award could be devised by the court.
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amendment such as the one proposed will be practically to eliminate the
use of the intervention rule altogether in cases where the Services are
attempting to enforce their contractual rights of subrogation. The mem-
ber, knowing that Blue Cross and Blue Shield have a right to intervene
in his action against the tort-feasor, will probably be more willing to
negotiate with the Services and settle the issue out of court. Such a
lessening of the burden on the court system would be more beneficial to
the already overextended litigation machinery than the actual use of
such an amended Rule 209.1.
